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This article explores how Australian courts have grappled with the challenges of changing 
context and a frenetic case load in their application of the rule against bias. In their 
efforts to keep this sacrosanct rule relevant and coherent they have employed three key 
tools of ‘calibration’: the ‘fair-minded lay observer’, the spectrum of standards, and a 
(re)emerging technique of sub-categorisation or ‘speciation’. The lay observer has wearied, 
becoming awkwardly indistinct in important contexts; the spectrum approach has 
enjoyed an expanding importance but now appears to have reached its high-water mark; 
however, the ‘speciation’ approach has shown its precision and is perhaps the key to  
the next generation of cases. This article re-maps the bias rule in Australia by reference  
to these three tools of calibration, thereby placing the accumulating critique of the  
‘lay observer’ test into clearer context. It also offers some predictions on the law’s  
future trajectory. 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N 
The rule against bias has a uniquely long pedigree in Western legal thinking. It 
was broadly declared in the Magna Carta, the 800th anniversary of which 
recently passed, that ‘justices, constables, sheriffs [and] other officials’ would 
be drawn only from ‘men that know the law of the realm and are minded to 
keep it well’.1 More specifically, in provisions dealing with the resolution of 
fine disputes by ‘twenty-five barons’ and the archbishop, it was declared that ‘if 
any of the twenty-five barons has been involved in a similar suit himself, his 
judgment shall be set aside, and someone else chosen and sworn in his place’.2 
This revered principle, in its modern form, continues to be of fundamental 
importance in its broad ongoing application to the executive and judiciary in 
Australia. It is important to the quality of decisions being made, to the 
confidence and cooperativeness of individuals being affected, and ultimately 
to the coherency and security of the social order.3 Yet despite this clarity of 
purpose and long lineage, this administrative law principle has been pro-
foundly tested by contemporary context. 
The modern challenges are many. Government in all forms (including the 
judiciary) continues to expand and diversify, to grapple with resource 
constraints, and to engage and interconnect more deeply with non-
government players.4 The political dimensions of decisions are more acute 
and more visible, potential conflicts of interest are more varied and less visible, 
and decision-making processes are more complex. Moreover, consumers of 
government services and litigants are more sophisticated in their expectations 
 
 1 GRC Davis, Magna Carta (British Library, 1977) 29. 
 2 Ibid 30. For brief overviews of the history of the rule, see John Tarrant, Disqualification for 
Bias (Federation Press, 2012) ch 2; Lord Woolf et al, De Smith’s Judicial Review (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 7th ed, 2013) 536–8 [10-008]–[10-011]. 
 3 See, eg, Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38, 107 [186] 
(Gageler J). See generally Matthew Groves, ‘The Evolution and Entrenchment of Natural 
Justice’ in Matthew Groves (ed), Modern Administrative Law in Australia: Concepts and 
Context (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 205. 
 4 On the issue of greater engagement by the judiciary, see, eg, the recent commentary on public 
comment by judges: Susan Bartie and John Gava, ‘Some Problems with Extrajudicial Writing’ 
(2012) 34 Sydney Law Review 637; Chris Finn, ‘Extrajudicial Speech and the Prejudgment 
Rule: A Reply to Bartie and Gava’ (2014) 34 Adelaide Law Review 267; Matthew Groves, 
‘Public Statements by Judges and the Bias Rule’ (2014) 40 Monash Law Review 115; Jasmin 
Moran, ‘Courting Controversy: The Problems Caused by Extrajudicial Speech and Writing’ 
(2015) 46 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 453. 
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and savvier in their strategies — and indeed recusal processes are often 
publicly scrutinised in real time.5 
There is no shortage of case law to test the old sacrosanct rule against bias. 
Although the pace has been more ferocious for the parallel ‘fair hearing’ limb 
of natural justice, both are busy fields of dispute. Importantly, both have felt 
the pull and pressure of migration litigation in recent years — which by virtue 
of its volume, focus and attendant controversy has been a remarkable force in 
modern Australian administrative law.6 
Faced with this degree of contest, changing context, and the natural inertia 
of an old legal principle, Australian courts now appear to deftly employ three 
tools for finer calibration and adjustment in the application of the bias rule. 
One was developed many years ago as a malleable legal measure of acceptable 
risk and perception — the notional ‘fair-minded lay observer’. A second 
appeared to crystallise clearly in the course of the politicisation of migration 
decisions in the early 2000s — the ‘spectrum of standards’ approach, which 
tailors applicable standards to context. More recently, however, a third tool of 
calibration has started to emerge with some force — what might be termed 
the ‘speciation’ approach by which sub-categories of bias are identified and 
distinguished by the application of altered rules. 
This article explores the current state of the rule against bias in Australia, 
with particular attention to the nature and interrelationship of these tools of 
calibration. Analysis reveals that the harried notional ‘lay observer’ has 
become awkwardly indistinct in important contexts. It also indicates that the 
‘spectrum’ methodology has enjoyed an expanding importance but is now 
receding from its high-water mark. And it reveals that an emerging ‘specia-
tion’ approach has shown its efficiency and precision and is perhaps the key to 
the next generation of bias cases. Under this latter approach, a deepening 
significance is attached to what were previously somewhat abstract sub-
classifications of bias. It is too early to say whether this trend marks a para-
digm shift, but there are signs that this categorisation approach is becoming 
the courts’ preferred tool for meeting difficult new arguments and adjusting 
old principle. 
 
 5 For emerging critique of traditional recusal processes beyond the scope of this article, see, eg, 
Grant Hammond, Judicial Recusal: Principles, Process and Problems (Hart, 2009); Abimbola A 
Olowofoyeku, ‘Bias in Collegiate Courts’ (2016) 65 International and Comparative Law Quar-
terly 895; Gabrielle Appleby and Stephen McDonald, ‘Pride and Prejudice: A Case for Reform 
of Judicial Recusal Procedure’ (2017) 20 Legal Ethics 89. 
 6 See Stephen Gageler, ‘Impact of Migration Law on the Development of Australian Adminis-
trative Law’ (2010) 17 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 92. 
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While findings of bias can resonate deeply through government and/or the 
legal profession, focused legal commentary on this topic is relatively rare.7 
More is written about the ubiquitous ‘fair hearing’ rule. Yet as noted above the 
case law on bias is also vibrant, and indeed from the contemporary founda-
tions laid in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy the law in this field has 
been edging towards ever-greater complexity.8 Further, there has certainly 
been an accumulation of dissatisfaction with the unkempt ‘lay observer’ test 
— in Australia9 and elsewhere.10 All of this is worthy of close attention. This 
article is an attempt to re-map and reinterpret the bias rule in Australia by 
reference to the tools of ‘calibration’ that it identifies, in the process consider-
ing the problems of the ‘lay observer’ test in the context of the newer judicial 
strategies for dealing with changing context and difficult cases. It also offers 
some predictions on the future trajectory of the law in this field. 
II   T H E  ‘F A I R-M I N DE D  LAY  OB S E RV E R’  
In the decision of Ebner the High Court rejected bias claims against judges 
who had shareholdings in public companies interested in litigation before 
them.11 Importantly, the Court re-coined a generic ‘reasonable apprehension 
of bias’ test — in the process finally discarding the old automatic disqualifica-
tion rule for ‘pecuniary’ bias. Under this test (building particularly upon the 
earlier decision in Webb v The Queen)12 subject to principles of waiver and 
necessity, ‘a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasona-
 
 7 For detailed and enduring overviews, in addition to those already cited above, see Robin 
Creyke, John McMillan and Mark Smyth, Control of Government Action: Text, Cases and 
Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2015) ch 10; Mark Aronson, Matthew Groves 
and Greg Weeks, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability (Law-
book, 6th ed, 2017), ch 9. 
 8 (2000) 205 CLR 337. 
 9 For previous critique of the state of the ‘reasonable observer’ test, see, eg, John Griffiths, 
‘Apprehended Bias in Australian Administrative Law’ (2010) 38 Federal Law Review 353; 
Matthew Groves, ‘The Imaginary Observer of the Bias Rule’ (2012) 19 Australian Journal of 
Administrative Law 188; Anna Olijnyk, ‘Apprehended Bias: A Public Critique of the Fair-
Minded Lay Observer’, AUSPUBLAW (Blog Post, 3 September 2015) 
<http://auspublaw.org/2015/09/apprehended-bias/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/YEU3-
H8VN>; Justice Debbie Mortimer, ‘Whose Apprehension of Bias?’ (2016) 84 AIAL Forum 45. 
 10 See, eg, Simon Atrill, ‘Who Is the “Fair-Minded and Informed Observer”? Bias after Magill’ 
(2003) 62 Cambridge Law Journal 279; Abimbola A Olowofoyeku, ‘Bias and the Informed 
Observer: A Call for a Return to Gough’ (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 388. 
 11 Ebner (n 8). 
 12 (1994) 181 CLR 41. 
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bly apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the 
resolution of the question’.13 The Court explained that such cases involve a 
two-step inquiry: first identifying exactly what it is that might cause impar-
tiality, and secondly seeking a logical connection between that and the ‘feared 
deviation’ from the course of deciding the matter on its merits.14 Despite the 
original language, this test is readily applied beyond the judicial decision-
making context.15  
The Ebner refinements still left us with a pliable, broadly cast test. It is 
conventionally understood to be concerned with outward appearance and 
public confidence16 — falling somewhere between the old automatic disquali-
fication rule and a search for proof of actual bias (which remains a distinct 
claim). But how might the test be applied coherently across very different 
types of decision-making? How much knowledge and understanding — 
necessarily a subset of full awareness17 — is to be attributed to the prefabricat-
ed lay observer? How much context is notionally included?18 Is knowledge of 
circumstances not actually known to the decision-maker at the relevant time 
attributed to the lay observer?19 Certainly it is clear that the test is in broad 
terms an objective one. We are regularly reminded that disqualification for 
bias is not triggered just by a party’s personal apprehension of partiality,20 and 
certainly not just by their fear of an adverse result.21 Nor, for that matter, is it 
 
 13 Ebner (n 8) 344 [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). As to the development 
of the concept of the ‘lay observer’ (and terminology employed) in the years before Ebner, see 
Groves, ‘The Imaginary Observer of the Bias Rule’ (n 9) 118–19. 
 14 Ebner (n 8) 345 [8]. 
 15 For recent confirmation, see Isbester v Knox City Council (2015) 255 CLR 135, 146 [22] 
(Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ). 
 16 See Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, 493 [12] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
 17 British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie (2011) 242 CLR 283, 300 [33] 
(French CJ). 
 18 See generally Griffiths (n 9); Groves ‘The Imaginary Observer of the Bias Rule’ (n 9). 
 19 See, eg, Lawrie v Lawler (2016) 168 NTR 1, 22 [106]; Day v Woolworths Ltd [2016] QCA 321. 
But see Islam v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 51 AAR 147, 155 [36]. 
 20 See, eg, Stone v Moore (2015) 122 SASR 54, 76–7 [51]–[54]; ALA15 v Minister for Immigra-
tion and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 30, [28]; Kennedy v Secretary, Department of Indus-
try [No 2] [2016] FCA 746; Ferdinands v South Australia [2016] FCA 1268, [36]; SZUEP v 
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 94, [12]. 
 21 See, eg, Cabcharge Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2010] 
FCAFC 111, [32]; ResMed Ltd v Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (2015) 232 FCR 
152, 158–9 [32]–[33]. 
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reversed by a declaration of impartiality by the impugned decision-maker.22 It 
has also been emphasised that the Ebner test is concerned with possibility,23 
rather than actuality or probability, and the double ‘might’ in the wording of 
the test (quoted above) has featured prominently in recent decisions24 — 
although this has been blunted in some recent cases by a more exacting 
application of the Ebner second step (ie the search for a logical connection 
between the matter identified as a concern and the feared partiality).25 
Critically, as alluded to above, there is ample room for contention about 
the knowledge and perception of the reasonable lay observer. As Kirby J has 
noted, often when a legal fiction is adopted ‘the law endeavours to avoid 
precision’.26 In the recent High Court decision in Isbester v Knox City Council 
(concerning a council process leading to a dog-destruction order), it was 
reaffirmed in broad terms that ‘[t]he hypothetical fair-minded observer … is 
to be taken to be aware of the nature of the decision and the context in which 
it was made as well as to have knowledge of the circumstances leading to the 
decision’.27 Yet a more precise tuning will often be required in particular 
cases.28 That precision can be elusive, and become somewhat subjective, and 
hence conclusions can be unpredictable. Small gradations in the understand-
ing attributed to the lay observer can quickly determine the outcome of  
a challenge. 
Some cases raising these issues might require a measure of self-reflection 
by the courts. As Kirby J has noted, in contemporary Australia the fictitious 
bystander ‘is not necessarily a man nor necessarily of European ethnicity or 
 
 22 See, eg, British American Tobacco (n 17) 330–1 [137] (Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
 23 See, eg, Duncan v Ipp (2013) 304 ALR 359, 369 [147]. 
 24 See, eg, Eastman v The Queen (2015) 295 FLR 426; Trombone Investments Pty Ltd v TBT 
(Victoria) Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 108; Crossman v Sheahan (2016) 115 ACSR 130; Golden v 
V’landys (2016) 339 ALR 610; Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v UGL Ltd [2017] VSCA 
128; Kuek v Phillips [2017] VSC 332, [77]-[78]. 
 25 See, eg, Golden (n 24) 623 [89]. Note in this respect Basten JA’s apparent resistance to the 
‘diminution of the double “might” test’: Crossman (n 24) 140 [33]. 
 26 Johnson (n 16) 507 [52]. 
 27 Isbester (n 15) 146 [23] (Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ) (citations omitted). 
 28 See, eg, Weinstein v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2008) 21 VR 29, 39 [26] 
(understanding of the character of an investigatory panel’s function?); O’Sullivan v Medical 
Tribunal of New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 374, [40]–[43] (knowledge of the nature of 
extraneous documents, the nature of the proceedings and the composition and powers of the 
tribunal?); British American Tobacco (n 17) 330 [134] (knowledge of special evidentiary 
provisions?). 
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other majority traits’.29 Even with such social neutrality accommodated, 
perception is a tricky thing to predict. We have, however, been reminded that 
the lay observer is assumed not to make ‘snap judgments’,30 is not ‘unduly 
sensitive or suspicious’,31 and would recognise that some judges are naturally 
‘more forthright’ than others.32 It has also been said that the observer  
will know that a judge is capable of departing from earlier expressed opin-
ions,33 and can put things out of their mind (eg prejudicial matter not open  
to them).34 
Some notable pressure points have emerged in the contemporary applica-
tion of this test. A selection of these are examined in this Part. They perhaps 
indicate that the volume, variety and complexity of modern challenges have 
fatigued the reasonable lay observer35 to a point where alternative methods of 
calibration are now more actively sought — and are possibly more important 
in the future operation of the bias rule. In fact we may be nearing (or perhaps 
returning to)36 the point of admission that in many circumstances the ‘lay 
observer’ test, despite the deliberate terminology, is in truth the law’s own 
sophisticated assessment37 of what the system can bear.38 Public perception 
does and should continue to play a role in that assessment — but perhaps not 
the dominant role that conventional statements of principle might suggest. In 
a sense, a new and quite complex ethical standard has emerged, still clothed 
— but barely — in a ‘lay observer’ test. 
 
 29 Johnson (n 16) 508 [52]. It has been pointed out that the observer should be considered as a 
single amalgam representing society — one that cannot be distilled to ‘particular personal 
qualities’: Groves, ‘The Imaginary Observer of the Bias Rule’ (n 9) 190. 
 30 AB v DPP (NSW) [2016] NSWCA 73, [21]. 
 31 Johnson (n 16) 509 [53] (Kirby J). 
 32 Stone (n 20) 82 [71]. 
 33 GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Reckitt Benckiser Healthcare (UK) Ltd [2013] FCAFC 
150, [38] (‘GSK’). 
 34 Zhai v Luo [2015] FCAFC 144, [38]. But see Eastman (n 24) 432 [31]. 
 35 For earlier expressed concerns, see, eg, Smits v Roach (2006) 227 CLR 423, 457 [96] (Kirby J). 
See generally Groves, ‘The Imaginary Observer of the Bias Rule’ (n 9) 199–202. 
 36 For discussion of the pre-Webb and Ebner position, see Groves, ‘The Imaginary Observer of 
the Bias Rule’ (n 9) 188–9. 
 37 See British American Tobacco (n 17) 306–7 [48] (French CJ). 
 38 See the call for explicit attention to other policy objectives in Atrill (n 10). 
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A  Exchanges at Hearings 
By way of first example, the reasonable lay-observer has been strained in the 
context of their scrutiny of adjudicative hearings. While judges are held to 
high standards,39 the cases illustrate well that in this setting the principles are 
applied with a heavy pinch of pragmatism and quite sophisticated attention to 
relevant context. Bias claims resting upon exchanges or behaviour at a court 
hearing are rarely successful. And tribunal members are found to fall short of 
the standard applied to them only slightly more often than judges.40 
It has long been accepted that a judge is not expected to sit in ‘Sphinx-like’ 
silence while arguments are presented and that a judge will often form and 
disclose tentative views (if only to draw a response or assistance from coun-
sel).41 Yet the contemporary challenges do make for colourful reading. 
Challenges have been unsuccessful in respect of continual irritation on the 
part of a judge;42 fractious exchanges with a judge;43 highly specific question-
ing by a judge44 or a tribunal member;45 probing questions and conspicuous 
reactions by a judge;46 significant intervention by a judge in cross-
examination47 — even erroneous or undesirable intervention;48 a judge’s 
declaration that claims were ‘fanciful and ridiculous’;49 and indeed a judge’s 
 
 39 See the discussion of the ‘spectrum of standards’ in Part III(B). 
 40 See, eg, Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 179 ALR 425; SZRUI v Minister for 
Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80; Ikosidekas v Karkanis 
[2015] VSCA 121; MZZLO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 963; 
MZZLO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [No 2] (2016) 246 FCR 111. 
 41 GSK (n 33) [36]. See also R v Watson; Ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248, 264; Concrete 
Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 577, 610 [112]; Scott v 
DPP (NSW) [2015] NSWCA 60, [27]–[37]; Ryan v Vizovitis [2017] ACTCA 3, [87]. 
 42 Michael v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 100. See also Elsafty Enterprises Pty Ltd v Gold 
Coast City Council [2011] QCA 84. 
 43 Reznitsky v DPP (NSW) [2015] NSWCA 338. See also George v Fletcher (2012) 10 ABC(NS) 
301, 333 [158]–[159] (words including ‘be quiet. Just shut up’ insufficient to raise a reasona-
ble apprehension of bias when taken in context); Waddington v Dandenong Magistrates’ 
Court [2014] VSCA 12, [19]–[23] (‘abruptness’ found to be warranted in the circumstances). 
 44 Zorbas v Sidiropoulous [No 2] [2009] NSWCA 197, [38]–[46]. See also George (n 43) 329–30 
[140]–[144]; Clyne v New South Wales [2012] NSWCA 265. 
 45 SZJBD v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 179 FCR 109. See also Tarrant v 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2015) 317 ALR 328. 
 46 AXQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 73. 
 47 Ball v McInerney [2014] NSWCA 331; R v T, WA (2014) 118 SASR 382. 
 48 Lancaster v The Queen (2014) 44 VR 820. 
 49 AB (n 30) [26]. 
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description of a party’s evidence as ‘just preposterous’50 (combined with fierce 
debate and interruptions).51 This latter case illustrates the level of attention 
paid to setting.52 The reviewing Court acknowledged the potentially cumula-
tive nature of bias, but still excused the lower judge by reference to context,53 
counsel’s level of experience, and the fact that the strong views were expressed 
after evidence and argument.54 Perhaps a high point of tolerance came in the 
recent Victorian decision of Cook v The Queen, where a bias challenge was 
unsuccessful in the context of what were said to be ‘needlessly argumentative 
and rude’ dealings by the judge with the defence counsel (that at times 
descended into ‘verbal abuse’) and comments to the effect that the jury would 
inevitably view the accused as ‘pathetic drug addicts’.55 
Challenges of this nature are frequent, despite the lack of success. In one 
sense it is entirely appropriate that the reasonable observer is forgiving in this 
context. As legal observers well know, one would be hard pressed to find in 
Australia a judge who, even at their most irate, would decide a case other than 
on its merits. And legal observers recognise the significant provocation that 
often precedes judicial impatience.56 But of course on a conventional under-
standing it is not legal observers that the Ebner rule is designed to reassure, 
and we have been told that the hypothetical observer should not be presumed 
to reject the possibility of prejudgment by a judge.57  
The review courts must provide pragmatic answers to these challenges for 
the sake of the lower judges’ ability to manage proceedings and interact with 
parties — even more so in an age of high caseload pressures, unrepresented 
litigants58 and bolder litigation strategy. However, this is one context that gives 
us reason to pause and consider whether this is all adequately explained by 
reference to the comfort of the reasonable lay observer, even one notionally 
 
 50 Spanos v Lazaris [2008] NSWCA 74, [43]. 
 51 For a rare example of a successful challenge, relating to statements in the primary hearing 
and reasons that the appellant’s claim was a ‘bag of chips’, a ‘try on’, a ‘baseless trifle’ and 
‘doomed’, and that the claim depended on a ‘rubbish’ proposition and was an ‘obvious abuse 
of process’, see Hinton v Alpha Westmead Private Hospital (2016) 242 FCR 1, 10 [25]. 
 52 Spanos (n 50) [43]. See also Reznitsky (n 43). 
 53 As to the significance of context in an assessment of critical comments by a judge, see also 
Barakat v Goritsas [No 2] [2012] NSWCA 36. 
 54 Spanos (n 50) [41]–[48]. See also Downey v Acting District Court Judge Boulton [No 5] (2010) 
272 ALR 705. But contrast AJH Lawyers Pty Ltd v Careri (2011) 34 VR 236. 
 55 [2016] VSCA 174, [84], [99], [102]. 
 56 See De Alwis v Western Australia [No 2] [2015] WASCA 42, [89] (McLure P). 
 57 British American Tobacco (n 17) 333 [144] (Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
 58 See, eg, De Alwis [No 2] (n 56) [71]; Ferdinands (n 20). 
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loaded up with an understanding of the training and oath of judges and their 
likely intervention with opinions.59 The lay observer must at least be cringing 
at some of the reported exchanges — and perhaps a truer contemporary 
explanation is that conduct at a hearing is measured by a more sophisticated 
legal assessment of what is acceptable. 
B  Multiple Involvements 
A more technical and more significant challenge to the coherency of the 
reasonable observer test is found in the context of ‘multiple involvements’ in a 
matter by a decision-maker.60 The cases on this appear to have been increasing 
in frequency, perhaps spurred on by two relatively recent High Court deci-
sions (discussed below). 
The issue of whether a matter being remitted should be returned to a 
differently constituted body has long been a live one (in both the court61 and 
tribunal62 contexts). And the 1983 decision in Livesey v New South Wales  
Bar Association63 (concerning findings on credibility in connected matters) 
has of course long provided an example of how difficulties can arise less 
directly in the context of overlapping or related proceedings.64 However, in 
this judicial context (and indeed the tribunal context) the issues are now 
made much more complex by contemporary case management techniques 
 
 59 Johnson (n 16) 492–3 [12]–[13] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
See also Szaintop Homes Pty Ltd v Krok (2012) 36 VR 56, 64–5 [28]–[29]; Bahonko v Moor-
fields Community (2012) 34 VR 409, 422 [32]; Duncan (n 23) 397 [155]–[156]; Stone (n 20) 
80–1 [63]. 
 60 The focus here is on multiple involvements in a decision-making capacity. On the issue of 
earlier conflicting roles, see Part III(C)(2). On the issue of earlier provision of advice on 
point, see, eg, Gabrielle Appleby and Stephen McDonald, ‘Disqualification of Judges and Pre-
Judicial Advice’ (2015) 43 Federal Law Review 201. 
 61 See, eg, Goodwin v Commissioner of Police [2012] NSWCA 379; Pavlovic v Universal Music 
Australia Pty Ltd [No 2] [2016] NSWCA 31; Hinton (n 51). 
 62 See, eg, MZZXM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 405;  
MZAEU v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 70 AAR 22. 
 63 (1983) 151 CLR 288. 
 64 See also Islam (n 19) (tribunal member involved both in the issue of a listening device — on 
suspicion of criminal conduct — and in the later refusal of a visa to the relevant person on 
the basis of criminal conduct); Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Chemical Trustee Ltd [No 
9] [2015] FCA 1178; Frugtniet v Tax Practitioners Board (2015) 67 AAR 336; Brown Brothers 
Waste Contractors Pty Ltd v Pittwater Council (2015) 90 NSWLR 717; Picos v Servcorp Ltd 
[2015] FCA 344; Amos v Wiltshire [2015] QCA 44; R v Kay; Ex parte A-G (Qld) [2016] QCA 
269; Crossman (n 24). 
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and the frequency of interlocutory orders,65 and indeed by the procedural and 
evidential peculiarities that might attend particular decision-making frame-
works.66 The reasonable lay observer standard becomes a difficult one to apply 
in such circumstances. 
The recent High Court decisions on point ultimately illustrate that the 
exact nature of the earlier involvement, and of any findings made, will be 
critical.67 In British American Tobacco Australia Services Limited v Laurie, the 
central issue was that a judge of the Dust Diseases Tribunal of New South 
Wales had made an interlocutory finding (in a separate case involving 
different parties) that the appellant (‘BATAS’) had a fraudulent policy of 
destroying potentially adverse evidence.68 A similar allegation was made 
against BATAS in this later case, before the same judge, and this prompted a 
claim of reasonable apprehension of bias (in the form of prejudgment). In the 
High Court, the parties’ arguments focused on the judge’s express qualifica-
tion (in the earlier matter) that the finding was only interlocutory and that the 
question remained ‘a live issue for the trial’ as contrary evidence had not really 
been led at that point.69 Nevertheless, a majority of the High Court upheld the 
challenge, deciding that the express qualification was not enough to remove 
the difficulty given the clarity, strength and seriousness of the earlier finding.70 
A different result was reached in the High Court decision of Michael Wil-
son & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (‘Wilson’),71 which emerged from litigation over 
 
 65 See, eg, Priestley v Godwin (2008) 251 ALR 612; George (n 43); Bob Jane Corporation Pty  
Ltd v ACN 149 801 141 Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1343; Berry v Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 
149 ALD 270; Zhai (n 34); Asden Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Dinoris [2015] FCA 729; 
Shaw v Australian Pump Industries Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 547; Ikosidekas (n 40); Yule v Irwin 
[2016] SASC 30; Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v UGL Ltd [2017] VSCA 128; Asden 
Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Dinoris [2017] FCAFC 117. See generally Anna Olijnyk, 
‘Apprehended Bias and Interlocutory Judgments’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 761. 
 66 See, eg, British American Tobacco (n 17) 330–1 [134] (Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Reece v 
Webber (2011) 192 FCR 254, 270–5 [43]–[60]. 
 67 For a clear example of previous involvement on the very same issues, see Maher v Adult 
Guardian [2011] QCA 225. For separate involvement on materially different matters, see 
Lashansky v Legal Practice Board [2011] WASCA 42; and see also Berg v DPP (Qld) [2016] 2 
Qd R 248; Amos (n 64). As to the distinct situation of previous statements of opinion on legal 
issues, see ResMed (n 21). 
 68 British American Tobacco (n 17). 
 69 Ibid 295 [21] (French CJ). 
 70 Ibid 333 [145] (Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ). Contrast the dissenting judgment of French CJ, 
with its emphasis on the interlocutory nature of the first finding, the significant time lapse 
and the strength of the express qualifications: at 308 [50]. 
 71 (2011) 244 CLR 427. 
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conduct following a professional split. One party had made several ex parte 
applications in the matter. The judge’s later participation in the trial was 
challenged on the basis of reasonable apprehension of bias. The Court 
concluded that the interlocutory orders obtained (with accompanying non-
disclosure orders) did not found a reasonable apprehension of prejudgment of 
issues to be decided at trial — even if the making or duration of the non-
disclosure orders was in error.72 Their Honours emphasised that the judge had 
made no determination of any issue to be decided at trial, no finding about 
the reliability of any party or witness, nor any choice between competing 
versions of events.73 
Clearly, as has long been acknowledged, the exact nature of the earlier 
involvement and of any earlier findings will be a key issue.74 The difficulty 
might therefore seem to be navigable, however the distinctions drawn in 
many of the contemporary cases and the complexity of the processes involved 
might be confounding for the lay observer.75 Moreover, there is a potentially 
significant practical problem here for both courts and many tribunal-type 
bodies. While in some instances initial case management and mediation 
might be kept away from the final substantive decision-makers, this may  
not always be desirable, possible or affordable. Indeed the efficiency and 
substantive benefits of some continuity in the management of a matter are 
now well recognised.76 
The courts have limited scope to respond to these modern practicalities 
with the lay observer test. In some instances, it might be possible to 
acknowledge the formal segmentation of a matter. The existing rule may still 
readily accommodate the incremental resolution of one contest or the early 
disposition of some aspects of a case.77 Beyond this, courts might attempt to 
 
 72 Ibid 447 [70]. As to the insufficiency of mere error, see also Reid v Commercial Club (Albury) 
Ltd [2014] NSWCA 98. 
 73 Wilson (n 71) 447–8 [69]–[73]. 
 74 See, eg, Watson (n 41) 264–6; Livesey (n 63) 300. 
 75 See Crossman (n 24) 140 [33]. In British American Tobacco (n 17) 328–30 [130]–[135], there 
was much argument before the High Court on whether the New South Wales Court of Ap-
peal had attributed too much technical knowledge to the lay observer, particularly as regards 
the special evidential rules governing proceedings of the type in question. 
 76 For an overview of the arguments for a broader approach, see Olijnyk, ‘Apprehended Bias 
and Interlocutory Judgments’ (n 65) and the critique and defence of Cadbury Schweppes Pty 
Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd [No 2] (2009) 174 FCR 175 in Groves, ‘The Imagi-
nary Observer of the Bias Rule’ (n 9) 193–4. 
 77 See, eg, Re Finance Sector Union of Australia; Ex parte Illaton Pty Ltd (1992) 107 ALR 581 
(‘Illaton’). 
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further load the fictional lay observer with procedural understanding so as to 
allow more prior involvement. Past decisions have noted that it is appropriate 
to attribute some understanding of ordinary judicial practice, which is not 
frozen in time.78 A less obvious possibility is a modernisation of the under-
explored exception to the bias rule that we loosely term ‘necessity’ — under 
which persons can act in situations where they are the only ones able or 
authorised to do so.79 Notions of practicability, reasonableness and overall 
public confidence have been called upon in previous necessity cases.80 
Ultimately, however, all of these mooted responses perhaps lead us to the 
realisation that this is another context in which we might question whether 
the revered lay observer can still coherently lead the way. There appears to be 
a more complex and more exacting contextual balancing to be undertaken in 
determining the appropriateness of multiple involvements. 
C  The Decision-Maker’s Own Reasons  
Another matter that has been contentious in recent years, and that perhaps 
awaits further close exploration, is the extent to which a challenged judge’s 
own reasons on the recusal application, or ultimate reasons in the substantive 
matter, are part of the context to be assessed by the reasonable lay observer 
and hence relevant to the challenge. The question can also, of course, arise 
beyond the judicial context. Once again, the cases reveal some strain in the 
application of the lay observer test. 
In British American Tobacco, the High Court majority ventured into the 
dispute between the parties as to whether the judge’s own reasons for refusing 
to disqualify himself in the second matter were ‘assumed knowledge’ of the lay 
observer. Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ took the view, contrary to Basten JA’s 
view below,81 that these ‘add[ed] nothing of moment to the material on which 
the hypothetical observer’s assessment is to be made’.82 Their Honours 
acknowledged that later comments of a judge might help to explain earlier 
questionable comments, but emphasised that a later assertion of impartiality 
per se was not important: it is assumed that a judge who feels compromised in 
 
 78 Johnson (n 16) 493 [13] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). See also 
Szaintop (n 59) 64–5 [28]–[29]; Bahonko (n 59) 422 [32]; Duncan (n 23) 381 [64]. 
 79 See generally Builders’ Registration Board of Queensland v Rauber (1983) 47 ALR 55. 
 80 See, eg, Illaton (n 77); Ebner (n 8) 359 [64]–[65]. 
 81 British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Laurie [2009] NSWCA 414 (‘British 
American Tobacco (NSWCA)’). 
 82 British American Tobacco (n 17) 331 [138] (Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
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the requisite way will not sit, so the judge who does decide to sit when 
challenged for apprehended prejudgment will necessarily have been confident 
of their impartiality.83 Here, it was said that in the event that the earlier 
finding gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of prejudgment the judge’s 
subsequent characterisation of the nature of the finding could not serve to 
allay that apprehension.84 The basic proposition that a judge’s own later 
assertion of impartiality cannot be allowed to decide the matter on a review is 
a logical one — they of course are not the ‘fair-minded lay observer’ upon 
whose perception the test turns. However, there would appear to be a thin 
division between assertions of impartiality and comments that may help to 
explain the earlier impugned conduct.85 
In the Wilson decision, Gummow ACJ, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ were 
critical of the attempt to rely on aspects of the final trial judgment in estab-
lishing a reasonable apprehension of bias, and (once again) critical of  
Basten JA’s preparedness to pursue such a line in the decision below.86 Their 
Honours considered that a search of the final reasons for some confirmation 
of a reasonable apprehension, or for some ‘crystallisation’ of the apprehended 
bias into actuality, heads for the ‘fallacious argument’ that because one side 
lost (or because there was an appealable error) the judge was biased — and 
indeed impermissibly blurs actual and apprehended bias.87 
The conspicuous differences in the approaches of the High Court and the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal suggests that there is more to be explored 
in respect of these issues. The High Court’s thinking, particularly from 
Wilson, has been duly reflected in some later Federal Court decisions,88 and 
has since been taken to the tribunal and indeed the ministerial decision-
 
 83 Ibid 330–1 [137]. See also Orleans Investments Pty Ltd v MindShare Communications Ltd 
(2009) 254 ALR 81, 94 [36]; CUR24 v DPP (NSW) (2012) 83 NSWLR 385, 395–6 [39]; 
Barakat (n 53) [62]–[63]. 
 84 British American Tobacco (n 17) 330–1 [136]–[138]. 
 85 Note also Basten JA’s concern that to disregard judges’ own assertions of impartiality might 
lead to perceptions that challengers are ‘manipulating the system’ — not attempting ‘to avoid 
a prejudiced mind, but [simply] an adverse result’: British American Tobacco (NSWCA) (n 81) 
[140]. See also Barakat (n 53) [58]–[64] (Basten JA, Young JA and Sackville AJA agreeing); 
Kay (n 64) [30]–[34]. 
 86 Wilson (n 71) 446–7 [67]–[68], referring to Nicholls v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd (2010) 
243 FLR 177, 200 [91]. See also Goodwin (n 61) [15]; Bagshaw v DPP (NSW) [2016] NSWCA 
340, [62]. 
 87 Wilson (n 71) 446–7 [67]. 
 88 Zhang v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 935, [31]–[38]; Asden 
Developments Pty Ltd (in liq) v Dinoris [2017] FCAFC 117, [48]–[49]. 
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making contexts.89 Yet it might be premature to attribute too small a role in 
this context to a decision-maker’s final reasons and own responses on a bias 
challenge — or indeed to any incremental correction (implicit or explicit) of 
earlier statements.90 After all, the courts have frequently emphasised in earlier 
reasonable apprehension cases the need for attention to broad context, the 
reality that bias can be a cumulative concept, and the fact that comments in a 
final decision and indeed other post-decisional conduct may be relevant.91 
Basten JA, whose more searching and flexible approach in the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal was rejected by the High Court in both British 
American Tobacco and Wilson, has himself on the critical issue retreated only 
to the position that it will be ‘rare’ for apprehended bias to be made out by 
reference to the final judgment.92 
Ultimately, on the issue of recusal reasons, there would appear to be a fine 
line between mere late assertions of impartiality (perhaps unhelpful if 
unsubstantiated) and elucidation of earlier impugned comments or actions.93 
And as regards the relevance of final reasons, whilst strong language may 
indicate nothing more than strong legitimate conclusions94 and final errors 
should not too readily be attributed to partiality, again there may be a fine line 
between these and incremental evidence supporting a reasonable lay observ-
er’s suspicion of one-sidedness. Moreover, given the ever-increasing accom-
modation of context in the application of the lay observer test, it might seem 
somewhat artificial to remove the decision-maker’s own response to the bias 
challenge, and their final reasons on the substantive matter, from the purview 
of the notional observer. A conscientious lay observer might see the former to 
be very relevant to their assessment, and possibly also the latter. The sophisti-
cated debate underlying these decisions, turning as it does upon some fine 
 
 89 MZZXM (n 62) [123]–[131]; Zaburoni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection 
[2017] FCA 654, [73]. 
 90 As to the latter, see Shaw (n 65) [37]–[39] (mitigating comments at later listings considered); 
Kuek v Phillips [2017] VSC 332, [74]. 
 91 See generally Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568, 573; Re Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Epeabaka (2001) 206 CLR 128, 139 [29]; Islam (n 19) 156–9 
[41]–[55]; MZZLO (n 40) [38]. 
 92 Re Henry; JL v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2015] NSWCA 89, 
[235]. See also MZAEU (n 62) 41–2 [45]. But see Young v King [2016] NSWCA 282,  
[20]–[24] (Basten JA, Gleeson JA agreeing). 
 93 For a case where a judge’s handling of recusal applications was seen to heighten the fair-
minded observer’s concerns about their conduct in the substantive matter, see AJH Lawyers 
(n 54). 
 94 See, eg, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164, 178 [44]; Zhai 
(n 34) [32]. 
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legal distinctions, seems once again to have drifted quite a distance from an 
inquiry into the likely instincts of the hypothetical observer. 
D  Multi-Member Decision-Making 
Another difficult question that has re-emerged recently, testing the mettle  
of the notional lay observer, is whether the manifest bias of just one member 
of a decision-making panel is terminal to the whole process.95 In years  
past, the review courts have on several occasions found the presence of one 
affected member too great a risk to be acceptable to the reasonable observer.96 
In Stollery v Greyhound Racing Control Board, the High Court found appre-
hended bias where the respondent board had deliberated on a complaint  
in the presence of the original complainant.97 The line of authority considered 
in Stollery was approved of in the prominent Queensland decision of Car-
ruthers v Connolly.98 In that case, one of two commissioners jointly conduct-
ing an inquiry was found to be affected by apprehended bias — particularly by 
reason of their prior provision of advice, public statements and conduct in 
hearings. Importantly for present purposes, it was held that the second 
commissioner also could not continue — one reason being that his associa-
tion and joint work over a substantial period with the disqualified commis-
sioner would give rise to a reasonable apprehension of there being an unac-
ceptable risk of partiality.99 
These ostensible precedents for a strict approach, closely considered, in 
fact seem to foreshadow that the issue of bias in multi-member contexts must 
be handled with close and able attention to the specific context. The important 
High Court decision in Hot Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy suggests, for example, 
that a contemporary court may be slow to act upon the peripheral involve-
ment of a person with a potential financial interest.100 And importantly,  
this broad issue split the New South Wales Court of Appeal in the key  
 
 95 See generally Olowofoyeku, ‘Bias in Collegiate Courts’ (n 5). 
 96 See McGovern v Ku-ring-gai Council (2008) 72 NSWLR 504, 553–7 [238]–[250]  
(Campbell JA). 
 97 (1972) 128 CLR 509, 519 (Barwick CJ), 520 (Menzies J), 526 (Gibbs J). See also Re Macquarie 
University; Ex parte Ong (1989) 17 NSWLR 113. Cf Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal 
(1990) 170 CLR 70. 
 98 [1998] 1 Qd R 339. 
 99 Ibid 392–3. 
 100 (2002) 210 CLR 438. 
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2008 decision of McGovern v Ku-ring-gai Council.101 In this case the issue 
arose in the context of possible prejudgment in local council decision-making. 
Basten JA considered that even though the votes of the two impugned 
councillors were not decisive, if they were disqualifiable their participation 
during deliberations and voting may have tainted the proceedings and vitiated 
the decision.102 However, Spigelman CJ rejected the general applicability of 
this ‘rotten apple in the barrel’ type test and applied a ‘but for’ analysis to the 
scenario — noting that even if the two councillors had not voted, the result 
would have been the same.103 
In the 2015 decision in Isbester v Knox City Council, the High Court ap-
peared to approve of the caution applied in early cases such as Stollery, but 
seemed also to suggest that it was appropriate to ask if the impugned decision-
maker played a ‘material part’ in the decision.104 This perhaps falls somewhere 
between Basten JA’s ‘bad apple’ approach and Spigelman CJ’s ‘but for’ ap-
proach. Yet the reference to this issue was brief in Isbester. Ultimately, it might 
be inevitable and appropriate, given the range and complexity of decision-
making contexts now facing the review courts, that this issue will turn upon 
close consideration of the precise situation — the issues, the background, the 
process, the relationships — and a sense as to the likely (or reasonably 
apprehended) influence of the impugned panel member upon their col-
leagues.105 In contemporary contexts (eg high-level or complex panel struc-
tures) a considerable amount of instinct and experience might go into any 
such assessment, and once again it is a difficult assessment to notionally 
devolve to the reasonable lay observer. 
The critique offered here of the ‘reasonable observer’ test, via these exam-
ples of evident strain upon its contemporary operation, is in some respects 
unproductive. Even if we acknowledge the increasingly animated elephant in 
the room — namely, the legally expert tempering of the hypothetical lay 
observer’s instincts — what alternative test could be proposed? It may well be 
that a truly generic test is no longer possible. The purpose of this article is not 
to offer a new test, but rather a new explanation of what is actually happening. 
 
 101 McGovern (n 96). 
 102 Ibid 524 [100]–[103]. 
 103 Ibid 510 [31], 513 [45]–[46], 515 [62]. 
 104 Isbester (n 15) 153 [48] (Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ); cf at 158 [65] (Gageler J). 
 105 In Marrickville Metro Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Marrickville Council (2010) 174 LGERA 67, 
104–5 [165]–[169], Tobias JA suggests that there might be a distinction drawn for these 
purposes between legislative-type functions and judicial-type ones. See also Isbester (n 15) 
156 [61] (Gageler J). 
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New tools of calibration have emerged and are emerging in the application of 
the bias test — born, it seems, of the combination of challenging new contexts 
and the fatigue of the ‘reasonable observer’. 
III   A LT E R NAT I V E  T O O L S :  SP E C IAT I O N  A N D  T H E  SP E C T RU M 
The two modern methodologies which are now to be examined — termed 
here the ‘speciation’ and ‘spectrum’ approaches — both emerged clearly in the 
contemporary Australian context in the frenetic case law of the early 2000s, 
with thin conceptual roots in the earlier jurisprudence. They developed at 
different paces, but with interlocking stories. A suitable place to start is the 
notion of speciation, which in a sense has deeper roots and is closer to the 
heart of the topic. 
A  The Species of Bias: Overview 
The modern ‘speciation’ of bias began in reverse. As noted above in passing, 
the important High Court decision in Ebner finally put to rest the traditional 
sub-classification of bias into pecuniary and non-pecuniary bias.106 It will be 
recalled that for the former a strict test had previously applied: once the 
decision-maker was shown to have a direct pecuniary interest, a conclusive 
presumption of bias arose resulting in automatic disqualification.107 This 
approach had been increasingly beleaguered by definitional problems and 
inconvenience, for example in contexts where judges had insignificant 
interests in large corporate litigants,108 and the principle was eroded through 
the Australian case law of the 1990s.109 The Ebner decision effectively merged 
the tests for pecuniary and non-pecuniary bias in Australia, leaving us with 
the ostensibly generic ‘reasonable apprehension of bias’ test. While Ebner itself 
effected some convergence of relevant legal principle, its long-term impact 
appears to have been very different. The discarding of the old pecuniary/non-
pecuniary distinction left space for renewed attention to more contemporary 
classifications of bias. 
There remained, of course, a well-established distinction between appre-
hended and actual bias. This has been periodically reaffirmed in the contem-
 
 106 Ebner (n 8). 
 107 See, eg, Dimes v Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 HL Cas 759; 10 ER 301. 
 108 See generally Aronson, Groves and Weeks (n 7) 674–6 [9.140]. 
 109 See, eg, Webb (n 12); Dovade Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Group (1999) 46 NSWLR 168; 
Clenae Pty Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1999] 2 VR 573. 
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porary cases, and with growing attention to the very different nature of the 
two inquiries.110 Whilst claims of actual bias were encouraged for a time by 
the mechanics of the migration laws,111 successful claims are now extremely 
rare — particularly in more formal decision-making contexts. Even at lower 
levels, administrative law’s ‘smoking gun’ is not often found in the workings of 
contemporary, well-organised government bodies. 
Beyond the apprehended/actual distinction, more precise taxonomies have 
been gaining clarity and acceptance. It is suggested, for example, that in broad 
terms bias may emerge from interests, conduct, association or knowledge of 
extraneous information.112 The precise characterisation of alleged bias will not 
always be easy,113 particularly given the growing prevalence of self-
represented claimants114 and the fact that bias can be cumulative.115 Moreover, 
it has been emphasised that any classification such as that noted above can 
only be a basic frame of reference, rather than a strict and comprehensive 
taxonomy.116 Yet the categorisation of bias is becoming more prominent,  
and indeed in the heavy traffic of cases new sub-classifications appear to  
be emerging.117 
The growing attention to the categorisation of bias is in part just a product 
of the patterns made visible by a steady accumulation of cases. However, it is 
argued in this article that there is something deeper at play in this trend. The 
courts are seeking new tractability in an old legal principle — in the face of a 
fast changing landscape and a yardstick ‘reasonable lay observer’ that is losing 
coherency. It may well be that this speciation of bias is now the settled 
trajectory of the Australian jurisprudence, and importantly, as will be seen, it 
has very real significance. The next challenge then lies in finding clarity in the 
division between categories, amidst the vast range of scenarios presented to 
the courts, so that the accumulated difficulties and perhaps subjectivities of 
previous approaches are not simply replicated in a new form. 
 
 110 See Wilson (n 71) 437–8 [33]. 
 111 See Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 
198 ALR 59, 81 [98] (‘Applicant S20’). 
 112 See, eg, British American Tobacco (n 17) 302 [38] (French CJ), citing Webb (n 12) 74  
(Deane J). 
 113 See, eg, Bahonko (n 59) 419 [23]; PLP v Legal Services Commissioner [2014] VSCA 253,  
[35]–[39]. 
 114 See, eg, Underwood v Gaudron (2015) 324 ALR 641; GJ v AS [No 2] (2015) 299 FLR 13. 
 115 See, eg, Carruthers (n 98) 376. 
 116 Ebner (n 8) 348–9 [24]. 
 117 See Part III(C). 
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B  The Spectrum of Bias 
Before we pursue the most important contemporary examples of the ‘specia-
tion’ of bias, and their significance, it is necessary to deviate to the intersecting 
story of the ‘spectrum’ approach. In recent years the Australian case law has 
steadily and conspicuously built on the idea that decision-making context is 
critical in the application of the bias rules. The idea that there is a ‘spectrum’ 
of standards to be applied has been keenly deployed in various contexts on 
many occasions. This was initially the courts’ most visible reaction, amidst the 
rush of modern case law, to the need for a greater responsiveness and coher-
ency in the bias principles. It effectively tempered the sensitivity of the 
reasonable lay observer by reference to the courts’ own hierarchy of decision-
making contexts. 
The spectrum approach appears to have firmly crystallised in the context 
of the politicisation of migration decisions in the late 1990s to early 2000s. In 
the 2001 decision of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia, 
Gleeson CJ and Gummow J particularly emphasised that in considering a 
charge of actual prejudgment (arising here from a Minister’s comments on 
radio and in a letter to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) the nature of the 
decision-making process and the identity of the decision-maker may be 
critical,118 and that the Minister’s conduct in this case had to be viewed in 
light of his being an elected official — accountable to the public and Parlia-
ment and entitled to be forthright and open about his portfolio.119 And later, 
in a surprisingly brief consideration and rejection of the alternative ‘reasona-
ble apprehension’ claim, their Honours again emphasised the error of apply-
ing to the Minister the standards of detachment applicable to judicial officers 
or jurors.120 
Soon after Jia, this ‘spectrum’ approach was also being carefully applied to 
tribunal members. In Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; 
Ex parte Epeabaka, the High Court considered a challenge based on a Refugee 
Review Tribunal member’s statement of personal opinion on the internet 
 
 118 (2001) 205 CLR 507, 539 [102]. See also Illaton (n 77); Matthew Groves, ‘The Rule against 
Bias’ in Matthew Groves and HP Lee (eds), Australian Administrative Law: Fundamentals, 
Principles and Doctrines (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 316, 318. 
 119 Jia (n 118) 533 [78]. 
 120 Ibid 539 [102]. See also Fraser v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 145 
ALD 337; Zaburoni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 654. For a 
detailed account of the history of the Jia litigation and critique of the finding that there was 
no bias made out, see Alan Freckelton, ‘The Benefit of Law, the Devil and the Jia Litigation’ 
(2015) 23 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 37. 
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about his position and role.121 The joint majority emphasised that conduct 
which may lead to a reasonable apprehension of bias in respect of a judge 
might not have the same result in respect of a tribunal member.122 The 
variable standard was again emphasised, in the tribunal context, in the  
recent decision of AZAEY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, 
which this time concerned a challenge based on interruptions, raised voices 
and sarcasm.123 
Looking beyond the migration context, the ministerial perspective was 
discussed a second time by the High Court in the 2002 decision of Hot 
Holdings Pty Ltd v Creasy.124 In that case (concerning a Minister’s decision on 
an exploration licence) it was emphasised that Ministers (in particular) might 
in some cases properly have regard to a wide range of considerations — 
including highly political ones — and that it is wrong to apply in every case 
the standard of independence applied to a judge.125 And in the years follow-
ing, this approach has been taken to various decision-making settings. As a 
notable example, the South Australian decision in Watson v South Australia 
confirmed the need for care in applying bias principles in the context of state 
Cabinet advice to the Governor on a parole decision.126 The important New 
South Wales decision of McGovern also emphasised the variable operation of 
the basic bias test across different contexts, itself according some leniency to 
local councillors.127 And the importance of context was again emphasised by 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Duncan v Ipp, a case concerning 
allegations against the Independent Commission Against Corruption.128 
The High Court returned to this issue, in broad terms, in the 2015 Isbester 
decision, emphasising that the application of the Ebner principles to decision-
makers other than judges must necessarily recognise and accommodate 
 
 121 Epeabaka (n 91). 
 122 Ibid 138 [27]. 
 123 (2015) 238 FCR 341, 353 [48]. See also SZRUI (n 40) [25] (Flick J), [93] (Robertson J). 
 124 Hot Holdings (n 100). 
 125 Ibid 455 [50]. 
 126 (2010) 278 ALR 168. 
 127 McGovern (n 96) 514 [51], 519 [80]. See also Marrickville (n 105) 104–5 [165]–[169]. 
 128 Duncan (n 23) 397 [152]–[156]. See also Carruthers (n 98) (commission of inquiry); Murlan 
Consulting Pty Ltd v Ku-ring-gai Municipal Council (2009) 170 LGERA 162 (commissioners 
and judges distinguished). For broader applications of the ‘spectrum’, see, eg, Greyhound 
Racing NSW v Cessnock & District Agricultural Association Inc [2006] NSWCA 333 (statutory 
corporation overseeing racing); Carbotech-Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2008] NSWSC 540 
(referee providing report); Colonial Range Pty Ltd v Akritidis [2017] VSC 337 (private build-
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differences between court proceedings and other kinds of decision-making.129 
Importantly, however, as will be explained below, this decision indicates that 
the high-water mark has perhaps now been reached for the ‘spectrum of 
standards’ approach. 
C  The Implications of Speciation 
1 An Alternative Test for ‘Prejudgment’ 
While the speciation approach was slower to emerge as a significant force in 
the contemporary case law, it did reveal its potential efficiency at an early 
stage. In the very case that moulded the ‘spectrum of standards’ approach into 
an organised qualification on the reasonable apprehension test, the High 
Court also overlaid it with a more significant clarification. It identified the 
bias in issue — ‘prejudgment’ — as a separate sub-species of bias and refined 
the rules that apply to it (though this has been the subject of lingering 
confusion). In this case, Jia, the High Court considered principally an 
allegation of actual bias that rested upon the Minister’s statements (prior to 
the making of decisions).130 Gleeson CJ and Gummow J emphasised that for 
bias in the form of prejudgment, establishing a ‘tendency of mind’ is not 
sufficient; there must be a mind incapable of alteration, as natural justice does 
not require the absence of any predisposition or inclination.131 The narrow-
ness of this explanation of prejudgment was a conspicuous fine-tuning of the 
rules, or at least a pointed clarification.132 In another case shortly after, Kirby J 
was accordingly at pains to emphasise that a defective or illogical approach to 
evidence or even irrationality in reasoning might create an impression of 
confusion, carelessness or incompetence, but does not easily lead to a finding 
of bias of this type.133 
Unusually, the primary focus in both of these High Court cases was on 
actual bias — a point which left some apparent confusion as to whether this 
 
 129 Isbester (n 15) 146–8 [22]–[28] (Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ). 
 130 Jia (n 118). 
 131 Ibid 531–2 [71]–[72] See also, again with particular emphasis on the ministerial context and 
the nature of the discretion involved, Fraser v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection 
(2015) 145 ALD 337. 
 132 Cf the earlier comments in R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex 
parte The Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546, 555; Vakauta (n 91) 570–1; Helljay Investments 
Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 166 ALR 302, 307 [12]. See generally Finn 
(n 4). 
 133 Applicant S20 (n 111) 82 [101]. 
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narrow approach applied to prejudgment generally (ie beyond the actual bias 
context).134 This confusion has lingered, in part by reason of vacillation in 
later prejudgment cases between the basic language of Ebner (the lack of an 
‘impartial mind’) and the language of Jia (a mind ‘incapable of alteration’).135 
At an abstract level, the Jia wording might be viewed simply as an elaboration 
or interpretation of Ebner for the purposes of its application in the specific 
context of prejudgment.136 Yet in practical terms, and in the setting of a 
doctrine so reliant on the lay observer’s perspective, the variation and hence 
the confusion following Jia is significant.137 The distinction between the two 
standards is well illustrated by the recent decision in ALA15 v Minister for 
Immigration and Border Protection, where it was noted that raw statistics on a 
judge’s previous decisions were not enough to found a prejudgment claim 
because a mere propensity of thinking is not enough.138 
In McGovern, Spigelman CJ attempted some valuable clarification on the 
critical issue. He emphasised that the correct approach now for reasonable 
apprehension of bias in the form of prejudgment is to ask whether an inde-
pendent observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might 
not be open to persuasion (in line with the narrower language of Jia).139 
Whilst there continues to be some vacillation between and juxtaposition  
of terminology, the approach in McGovern appears now to be largely accepted 
as correct.140 
The key point then, in practical terms, is that in an important respect it is 
harder to establish ‘prejudgment’ than other species of bias. This can be 
defended as a logical variation given that predisposition (beyond that driven 
by interest, association or access to extraneous material — the other broad 
 
 134 The general application of the approach was, however, quite clearly implied in the comments 
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 135 For recent examples, see Mogan Holdings Pty Ltd v Harrison [2011] VSCA 202; Chin v Legal 
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 137 See Marrickville (n 105) 100–1 [146]–[153]. 
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categories of bias) is a natural and proper product of human experience and 
should be presented and tested rather than denied. More importantly, from 
the perspective of the arguments in this article, the courts have in this context 
found the calibration they needed in a ‘speciation’ type approach — ie by 
carving out a sub-category of bias with a more particularly worded test. The 
tightening of the applicable test firmly directs the reasonable lay observer and 
indeed in Jia and McGovern rendered the accompanying ‘spectrum of 
standards’ somewhat redundant. 
2 An Alternative Test for ‘Incompatibility’ 
Another conspicuous emphasis upon the distinctions between different types 
of bias came in Isbester.141 The High Court considered facts approximating the 
scenario of one person effectively acting as both ‘prosecutor’ and ‘judge’ — 
and appeared to approve the categorisation of this as ‘incompatibility’.142 The 
case concerned a dog-destruction order by a local council committee — open 
to it by reason that the owner had been convicted of an offence under the 
legislation.143 One committee member had substantial involvement in the 
prosecution as well as in the destruction decision. The Court held that there 
was a reasonable apprehension of bias notwithstanding that the committee’s 
decision was in a sense a second step on a different issue (ie penalty) — 
particularly because much of the same evidence would be relevant and no 
clear line could be drawn between the member’s different involvements.144 
Importantly for present purposes, the Court appeared to accommodate 
this notion of ‘incompatibility’ within the category of ‘interest’ bias by 
explaining that ‘interest’ for these purposes did not require some material or 
other benefit but might merely involve vindication of a person’s earlier 
opinion and role.145 In the course of its reasoning the Court carefully distin-
guished this situation from ‘prejudgment’ (which logically frees the assess-
ment from the narrower Jia version of the lay observer’s inquiry). It was also 
noted that the Ebner second step (the search for ‘connection’ with feared 
impartiality) was ‘necessarily … satisfied’ or ‘obvious’ in incompatibility 
 
 141 Isbester (n 15). 
 142 Ibid 149 [34] (Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ). Distinguish the situation of a prosecutor 
wishing to oppose an appeal: Viscariello v Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner [2015] 
SASC 132, [65]–[67]. 
 143 Domestic Animals Act 1994 (Vic) ss 29(4), 84P(e). 
 144 Isbester (n 15) 151 [40]–[42] (Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ). 
 145 Ibid 152 [46]. See also Golden (n 24) 626–7 [111]–[119]. 
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scenarios146 — and indeed that the standard applied in this context would in 
fact be similar to that applied in high-level decision-making. 
The last point is significant for present purposes. However, a few other 
implications should first be noted. First, there might in future be some fine 
lines to be drawn between ‘incompatibility’ bias (involving an ‘interest’ — 
including vindication of an earlier view) and other types of ‘pre-involvement’ 
(which will presumably remain under the prejudgment rules). The hazy 
boundary here is now significant by reason of the several apparent differences 
in the approaches to be applied. Secondly, the discarding of the Ebner  
second step might logically also seem apposite for cases of ‘association’ bias 
(as has been already been suggested)147 and even for other categories of 
‘interest’ bias.148 
Most interesting, from the perspective of this article, is Isbester’s visible 
retreat from the ‘spectrum’ approach — at least in the case of what we might 
now term ‘incompatibility’ (ie acting as both prosecutor and judge). A key 
issue before the Court was whether the rules on this point were to be less 
stringently applied in a non-judicial context. The Court essentially responded 
‘no’. Most particularly, it was said at one point that identifying a decision as 
‘quasi-judicial’ (or not) is distracting in such cases.149 At another point their 
Honours clearly indicated that ‘incompatibility’ operates similarly for judges 
or ‘member[s] of some other decision-making body’.150  
It might be argued that this carries no significant change in direction — 
that exceptions to the prominent spectrum approach were simply hidden for a 
time by the case law’s focus upon prejudgment-type claims (and the lack of an 
unusual case to test its perimeter). In any event, we must now ask whether the 
‘spectrum’ approach, so influential in the last two decades, should also be 
discarded or doubted in other contexts. It may be, for example, that this 
flexible approach is now unlikely to be applied in any other cases of ‘interest’ 
bias — both the older pecuniary interest claims and more contemporary 
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conflict of interest scenarios. If the question is what the reasonable lay 
observer would tolerate, it might seem logical that they would be similarly 
unforgiving in ‘interest’ scenarios whatever the level of decision-maker. 
Similar arguments might be made as regards ‘association’ bias cases and  
even ‘extraneous information’ cases. It is conceivable that ultimately the 
spectrum methodology might only enjoy firm footing in the ‘prejudgment’ 
category of bias, which might itself now be at risk of some incursion by  
the notion of ‘incompatibility’ given possible overlaps in the context of 
multiple involvements. 
In Isbester, the speciation methodology excluded the spectrum approach. 
In cases such as Jia and McGovern, it rendered the spectrum analysis some-
what redundant. The prediction in this article is that speciation might become 
the courts’ preferred tool for meeting new arguments and adjusting old 
principle. This is based on the thinking that, first, the reasoning in Isbester has 
logically set up a further retreat from the spectrum approach, and second, the 
speciation methodology might seem to be more predictable and precise — not 
least because it can in a sense actually refine the applicable test (rather than 
just the sensitivity of the lay observer). 
IV  CO N C LU SI O N S 
The rule against bias provides the quintessential example of context-driven 
legal evolution. The testing of old principle in this field of Australian  
administrative law has come from many directions — from the expansion, 
diversification and increased engagement of government; from the growing 
complexity of decision-making processes; from the sharpening political 
dimensions of decisions; from the variegation of potentially competing 
‘interests’; and from the growing sophistication of the public in terms of both 
understanding and expectation. 
In broad terms, the purpose of this article has been to explore how the 
courts have grappled with these challenges, through the frenetic case load  
of recent years, in their efforts to keep this sacrosanct legal rule relevant  
and coherent. More specifically, it has examined how the doctrine has evolved 
and might continue to evolve via the use of three key tools of ‘calibration’ in  
its application. 
The ongoing deployment of the ‘reasonable lay observer’, as a measure of 
risk and perception, reminds us of the deep importance of public confidence 
in this context. However, close analysis of some difficult applications of the 
standard confirm that the lay observer, so prominently wielded as the 
yardstick since Webb and Ebner, is somewhat worn and wearied — and 
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presents an increasingly indistinct path through a complex contemporary 
array of challenges. The courts have felt this and have stretched the imputed 
knowledge and understanding of the lay observer as far as possible to house 
the increasingly sophisticated analysis and balancing needed in the cases. Yet 
importantly, the courts have now also been looking elsewhere for responsive-
ness and modern coherency in the doctrine, and have been seeking rational 
bases for their necessary intrusion and extrapolation in the lay observer’s 
notional assessment of difficult contemporary scenarios. 
Most prominently to date, the courts have applied a ‘spectrum of stand-
ards’ approach, which in a sense allows them to moderate the sensitivity of the 
notional lay observer by reference to a hierarchy of decision-making contexts. 
However, it appears that after a decade and a half of keen application this 
methodology has now reached its high-water mark. It was clearly rejected as a 
basis for applying a more lenient approach to ‘incompatibility’ bias in Isbester. 
It may yet retreat further — conceivably back to its heartland in the ‘prejudg-
ment’ cases. 
Isbester reveals that the retreat from the ‘spectrum’ approach perhaps re-
flects a new trajectory in the jurisprudence, one built around the sub-
categorisation or ‘speciation’ of bias. From a quieter start, this methodology is 
now gaining momentum and the significance of the distinctions drawn is 
certainly deepening. ‘Prejudgment’ and ‘incompatibility’ are now governed by 
somewhat tailor-made principles, and there are signs that more categories 
might receive similarly specific attention in the near future. Even the basic 
distinction between ‘actual’ and ‘apprehended’ bias appears to be sharpening, 
as the High Court insists on a clear division of inquiries in the lower courts.151 
From a broader vantage point, how might we assess this recent history of 
evolution in the rule against bias? This study would seem to reveal that while 
the challenges of modern context are unavoidable in this field of law, the 
principled guidance offered by the new tools of ‘calibration’ can help to make 
the tiring lay observer test more predictable and sustainable — in a sense they 
allow the courts to carefully tailor the lay observer’s brief to help them 
navigate the contemporary contests. But should the lay observer test be 
sustained, given that it now clearly costumes a more sophisticated analysis? 
The conclusion here is still ‘yes’. While it does remain — even somewhat faded 
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and ill-fitting — the notion of public perception is not forgotten152 and hence 
the increasingly sophisticated court decisions are unlikely to stray too far 
from their critical function of reassuring litigants and the public at large that 
the system is ‘fair’.153 
There are in fact a number of core purposes that might be attributed to the 
rule against bias (as noted at the outset of this article). In broad terms, these 
include its role in sustaining the quality of decision-making, its shoring up of 
the confidence and cooperativeness of individuals being affected and ulti-
mately its contribution to maintaining the coherency, propriety and security 
of the social order. The future balancing of the various methodologies 
identified in this paper — the three tools of ‘calibration’ — might benefit from 
some renewed deliberation on these fundamental purposes and the priority 
accorded to each. Added to this, of course, are issues of workability. While the 
‘speciation’ approach to bias might appear to be gaining momentum, and 
might appear to offer some new precision, there are challenges lining this 
path. In the first place, the jurisprudential history illustrates that the range of 
possible bias scenarios is potentially large. Secondly, growing intricacy and 
variability in the application of the rules might in some ways unsteady the all-
important public confidence that they serve. And most importantly, as noted 
in the course of this article, finding clarity in the division between categories 
might not be an easy task. The hazy distinctions inherent in this field of law 
were at the heart of both the original Ebner decision and indeed the recent 
High Court decision in Isbester. 
What must be conceded at this juncture is that the rules on bias are grow-
ing increasingly complex, despite the ostensible simplification in Ebner that 
ushered in the modern era of case law. This phenomenon is perhaps an 
inherent trait of contemporary common law process, despite the best efforts of 
judges to organise and streamline. Often the periodic attempts to simplify just 
return us to the beginning of another journey. Certainly in the natural justice 
context, the sheer volume and variety of arguments presented to the courts 
produce a legal entropy that is hard to curtail. Moreover, the idea of ‘fairness’ 
has proven itself over many years to be at once both a fundamentally simple 
and intractably complex concept. 
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